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The Contraction and Detraction Thesis 
 




The alternation of contraction and detraction processes in public administration is linked with 
long-term tendencies in the political system. From the last quarter of the 19th century the 
influence of the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) increased, but later the executive power 
has been strengthened. This is a tendency discernible in all modern industrialized states. 
 
The contraction and detraction phenomena can be related to the amount of controversial 
political issues in the society. It would seem justified to assume that when the amount of 
conflicts is great, a political contraction will take place. Then, it is important what values the 
bureaucracy realizes. Conversely in a period of strong values community there will be a 
political detraction, since the need for an autonomous bureaucracy can be met at a smaller 
risk. Also, an autonomous bureaucracy functions best in a state of values community and will, 
moreover, tend to simulate a community of values and ignore conflict. It is in the interest of 
the autonomous bureaucracy to soften political and social conflicts. Such conflicts can, 
precisely, be signs of an outbreak of new values systems threatening the autonomous civil 
servants’ roles. Therefore, an autonomous bureaucracy will be a conservative element. This 
point of view implies consequences for the idea of the ever-increasing bureaucratization of 
society, in the sense that bureaucracy will steadily fortify its dominating position in society. 
The condition for such a bureaucratization is that the production of new values in society 
comes to a halt. If this is the case, the power chances of bureaucracy will increase: In the long 
run, professional civil servants can realize established values far more efficiently than can 
amateurs and voluntary forces. The result will be a biased distribution of information and 
influence in favour of bureaucracy. As soon as there is a crack in the values community, the 
civil servants roles will be redefined towards a greater dependence of political authorities 
(Jacobsen 1964: 259-260). 
 
Knut Dahl Jacobsen developed this theory on transfers of power in a democracy in his 
doctorate thesis on the politics of agricultural administration in Norway, published in 1964 
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(Jacobsen 1964). The law - referring to stable features in a place- and time- determined 
institution - the public administration of agriculture in Norway - is based on three premises: 
 
1) Democracies, as we know them, have elected, democratic as well as appointed 
bureaucratic institutions. Modern democracies therefore contain non-democratic and 
pre-modern institutions.  
2) There are constantly disjunctions, disagreements and strife between democratic and 
bureaucratic institutions.  
3) Bureaucracies are expansive on behalf of expert knowledge and regulations, while the 
elected state organs (let us term them parliaments) are expansive on behalf of national 
will and representation (even though groups, especially party groups in the 
parliaments may have more limited and even conservative ambitions, opposing an 
"expansion of representation").  
 
The law on contraction-detraction can be formulated as follows: Bureaucracies will typically 
expand when there is "peace" or a values community in the society. Parliaments on the other 
hand will increase their powers when there is a plurality of conflicting values in the society, 
and particularly when new values assert themselves and obtain a majority representation in 
the parliaments. Then, parliaments will endeavour to assert their powers and gain control of 
the public bureaucracy. Such control can alter the recruitment criteria to positions in the 
bureaucracy, making knowledge of and respect for the new values such a criterion. The core 
of the contraction and detraction thesis (the CD thesis) is simple: 
 
Values conflict Æ contraction 
Values community Æ detraction 
 
It can be seen as a law of the transfers of power in democracies, from parliamentary rule 
based on new popular values developed in struggle to the rule of bureaucracy based in (real or 
assumed) value consensus and implemented through the application of rules and established 
knowledge. The law is a departure from the idea that in established democracies the 
parliament-bureaucracy relation is stable, with parliaments always ‘on top’. It purports that 
the two institutions are independent of each other and function on different principles. There 
is a struggle for power between them, bureaucracy winning under certain conditions and 
parliaments under others. Jacobsen found those conditions in society, in the dynamics 
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between economic and political organization, in the struggle between new and established 
ideas and in the degree of values conflict. The law is a specification of the dynamics between 
state and society in a modern democracy. Capitalism impels class division, profit as value and 
market as economic necessity. Dahl Jacobsen sees this emergent process in the altered 
composition of the Storting in the 19th century. Representation in Parliament, the identities of 
the elected members changed from "local (territorial) representation" to "class (social) 
representation" (Jacobsen 1964: 192). Economic changes are reflected and reproduced in 
political institutions and are developed further and modified through political activity. The 
theme of the law is the relation between parliament and administration as affected by 
characteristics of politics over time. The analytical focus is on the professional bureaucrats, 
how they develop their relations to political authority, to science and education and to their 
‘clients’. Emerging capitalism creates class- and rural-urban divisions. The new social classes 
express themselves in interest organizations (e.g. the Farmers' Union and the Society for the 
Benefit of Norway, Jacobsen 1964: 179-180) and in political parties (e.g. the Right and the 
Left parties created in the 1880’s). The CD theory defines as aspect of how these 
organisations relate to the interplay of elected institutions and bureaucracy in democratic 
states. 
 
The CD thesis highlights the dynamic and shifting relation between parliaments and 
bureaucracies and contains a theory of modernization. The local is absorbed into and 
transformed in the national. The new economic order of capitalism is propelled and modified 
by the state. The dynamic of bureaucratic meritocratic and hierarchic authority and 
democratic elected authority is functional for emergent capitalism, because the dynamic 
combines active representation of interests with effective and legitimate implementation of 
decisions. In this way the CD-thesis captures two tensions: (1) between the old and the new 
society, between patriarchy and traditional authority and emergent democracy or popular 
authority and (2) between elected authority (in parliaments) and appointed authority (in 
bureaucracies) in the new society, suggesting that the power of democracy is dependent upon 
a vital values plurality (often spoken of as a struggle between ruling regime and its 
opposition). The new society is the specialized society with distinctions between state and 
society, between social classes, between public and private spheres and between politics and 
administration. It is these new structures that assign such importance and centrality to the 





Professor Knut Dahl Jacobsen was born in 1925, in Kristiansand. He worked as a journalist 
before going to Oslo to study political science, and was one of the first in the new specialty to 
obtain the Master of Science degree. His masters thesis, Politics and Administration. The 
Ranking of some Loyalties among Public Servants, was presented in 1955. The American 
sociologists Paul Lazarsfeld and Allan Barton, who were in Norway in connection with the 
Marshall Aid, inspired the work. He did research in an interdisciplinary environment 
comprising jurisprudence specialists Thorstein Eckhoff and Torkel Oppsal, sociologists of 
law, Nils Christie and Thomas Mathiesen, the sociologists Vilhelm Aubert and Yngvar 
Löchen, the historian Jens Arup Seip and the political scientists Henry Valen, Stein Rokkan 
and Thomas Wyller. Later and especially through Johan P. Olsen, American organization 
theory in the Herbert Simon and James March tradition became important. In his doctoral 
thesis (Jacobsen 1964) the CD thesis was formulated for the first time. It was later developed 
in several publications). In 1965 he was appointed to a professorship and became Norway's 
first professor of political science. Having obtained a new professorship of Public 
Administration and Organization Theory at the University of Bergen, he left Oslo in 1969. 
His pleasant, masterful and inquisitive manner attracted many students and researchers to the 
"Bergen School". Dahl Jacobsen did administration research in the historical sociology 
tradition and contributed a number of publications to studies of the welfare state. He 
contributed original research on the importance of science and the professions for leadership 
cultures, for political thinking and for the development of organizations. 
 
Dahl Jacobsen worked for the interests of social science in the Committee for Norwegian 
Research (‘Hovedkomiteen for norsk forskning’), supported the introduction of the study of 
politics and administration in colleges and high schools and was a member of international 
professional networks. Between 1972 and 2000 some 550 masters students and some 30 Phd 
students completed their degrees under Dahl Jacobsen’s inspiration and guidance. In this way 
the discipline of administration and organisation theory as an empirically based science 
became an important source of knowledge for a broader public and a ‘working knowledge’ in 
public administration, in organizations and enterprises. Knut Dahl Jacobsen died suddenly in 




Shmuel Eisenstadt’s theory of bureaucratisation (Eisenstadt 1959) provided some of the 
paradigmatic ideas of the CD thesis. Three of them seem important: 
 
- When modern society separates into competing collective participants, these will fight 
for influence in the public bureaucracy. The competition forces the bureaucracy to 
develop an ideological/normative basis of its own, in order not simply to vanish into 
the power sphere of any one of the participants. The bureaucracy must at the same 
time adapt its purpose, structure and culture to keep in pace with new political 
developments and to have influence (p. 307). 
 
- A bureaucratization takes place when the power and decision models of bureaucracy 
pervade into fields of private activity. Instances of this are private enterprises made 
public property, and private organizations or parties making their members 
"employees", or universities making researchers advisers to others (p. 312). 
 
- De-bureaucratization is when private organizations, elites or persons take over public 
tasks or institutions. Instances: Parents taking on the management of public schools, or 
private capital appropriating public railways, power stations and telecommunications 
(p. 312.). 
 
Order in a class divided democratic society. The role of knowledge. 
 
The CD theory elucidates the interaction between new classes and knowledge production. The 
class division created a values plurality in politics. The ‘new plurality’ of specialised 
knowledge facilitated insight into how different values could be realized. In this way 
knowledge specialists invested the class position with "body and character" and developed 
both class specific and more common (integrative) action models. Knowledge production 
became a force of innovation, both within class positions (within for example labour and 
industrial and agricultural capital) and ‘above’ them (in the form of knowledge of democratic 
organisation, of how autonomous professions could be trusted across class and nation 
boundaries). The professions, through their development and control of knowledge models 
were important actors in the ‘operationalisation of political decisions’ in the organization of 
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public administration. The struggle between professions for positions in the public 
administration was in this way part of the political struggle. Political science developed 
knowledge about collective institutions and the conditions for common participation in them 
(like mutual respect and trust). The CD theory elucidates the tension and the movements 
between the bureaucratic and political positions and between the common institutions and the 
specific interests in society. In the modern world class struggle and knowledge struggle -each 
of them independent processes- were intertwined. The complex political field thus created 
was the basis of the movements of power between state and society, between parliaments and 
bureaucracies. The shifts could, in some periods, be of a conservative nature, in other of an 
innovative nature, in some periods brought about by class power and in others by the power of 
knowledge administered by professionals and bureaucrats. The CD thesis captures some of 
the flexibility and therefore durability of democratic states. Central to Dahl Jacobsen was the 
relation between political institutions and class interest in the democratic society. 
 
… what is, to me, problematic in a moral and political sense is related to the effects of 
knowledge transfer going beyond the mere transfer of knowledge. One issue is the 
class-related effects of the forms of knowledge transfer chosen… 
(Jacobsen 1964 : ii). 
 
Knowledge in politics 
 
Jacobsen studied the knowledge models developed within three basic types of professions. 
The classic, normative professions (priests and lawyers) saw to it that the established values 
were complied with in practice. The ideal was one stable system managed by the elite 
(patriarchy) incorporating all (all under one God, all laws developed from a given set of 
tradition-bound values). The technical professions (like doctors, engineers and military 
officers) studied and organized processes aimed at an efficient achievement of specific 
objectives. The social professions that emerged together with the socially responsible state 
(the welfare state), like economists, sociologists, trained social workers and political 
scientists, were regulating professions, suggesting how the state could intervene in society to 
realise political objectives. Jacobsen demonstrated that the professional groups were 
important both in the development of political programmes and decisions and in their 
operationalisation and implementation. It was when professional groups developed 
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knowledge of relevance for weak groups in society indicating ways of increasing the political 
power of weak groups that weak groups organised and, when a democratic constitution was in 
place, demanded a space in power-wielding. Under that condition the established society and 
its elites put up resistance usually by strengthening the bureaucracy and demanding that it be 
loyal to government elites. With more self-confidence weak groups would move to increase 
their representation in parliaments. With success their leaders would demand parliamentary 
control of the bureaucracy, even demanding a radical reorganisation of the bureaucracy. So 
there was under such conditions a double contraction of power: contraction of power in the 
bureaucracy around the established elite and contraction of power in parliaments as the new 
mobilising, earlier weak groups gained positions there. In this way new values made their way 
into politics, into the state. The relevant professionals were favoured and elaborated 
administrative systems for their implementation. Bureaucracy was forced to accept political 
leadership. The new knowledge was used to reorganise the bureaucracy.  
 
In phases of detraction the political-administrative process was different. A new regime was 
in place and the value struggle in society had subsided. The earlier rulers were defeated. Their 
voice was no longer heard. The public administration was reorganised and the earlier 
marginal professionals had taken up leading positions in a reorganised public administration. 
In that situation the production of new knowledge and innovation was less important. The 
power of professional bureaucracy expanded. The power of parliaments was reduced. 
Detraction meant the expansion of the technical ends –means- efficiency thinking and 
routines. It was only when the values underlying the power of such an autonomous 
bureaucracy were contested that a new mobilisation process could arise. 
 
In a situation where there is agreement on policy and the values structure is stable, the 
end-means relations will be in focus, and the specialist knowing best these relations, 
his appreciations will, on the whole, be accepted simply because he is the specialist. 
Reversely, his specialist reputation will suffer a steep decline as soon as these 
fundamental values become controversial in his field. Being a specialist on rejected 
ideas is relatively unimportant (Jacobsen 1964: 13). 
 
A new discipline 
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The CD thesis contributed to the studies of organizations and public administration as an 
independent discipline of academic empirical research. It brought together organization 
theory, law and role sociology, history and political science. Bureaucracy and professions 
were living institutions with political influence. Theories of organization cast light upon the 
inner life of the institutions. Law sociology and criminology investigated how the rules both 
empowered and established limitations, how the rules drew dividing-lines between the normal 
and the deviation, between the legal and the criminal. Historical research provided insight into 
the conditions of domination and subordination, and what is needed of forces, resources and 
time to gain acceptance for new values. Political science provided insight into the operation of 
formal institutions, their power, their inertia, and their ruptures, confusions and ambiguities 
apt to weaken them and open them to change. Dahl Jacobsen contributed to the hermeneutical 
turn in political science. What defined the "structures" of society was the distribution of 
interpretations of reality and attitudes. Thus, political structure (as an explanation of action) 
was defined as follows: 
 
What I have put together under the notion "political structure" are such features of the 
attitude to technical reform work and to the extent, nature and forms of public activity 
existing in the administration, the clientele and the political authorities 
(Jacobsen 1964: 10). 
 
Formalization – a model of the value-power relation 
 
In its simplest and most general form the law purports that in democratic societies when the 
level of values conflict increases political power is concentrated in the institutions of the 
power elite. The state administration is placed under political control and the opposition 
movements struggle to concentrate their power in parliaments making them ever more 
representative of their interests. By decreasing conflict over values in society and increasing 
community of values, power is disseminated, -not primarily downwards in the hierarchy to 
another level (for example to counties), but horizontally, from political to bureaucratic 
institutions (detraction - by the established elite) and from society and the bureaucracy to 
parliament (contraction - by new rising movements and their leaderships). It is when the 
contraction struggle subsides in success that detraction can set in. Values are in place. 
Bureaucrats and specialists are given wider space and power of discretion. Penetrating the 
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reproductive juridical power of bureaucracy the scope of work for the empirical regulatory 
professions is enlarged. The contact points between client and administration are multiplied, 
but not necessarily in a way making the particular problems of the clients better understood or 
their interests complied with.  
 
The dynamics in the movement of power between democratic institutions and bureaucracy at 
the threshold of modern society are different from those observed when the modern society is 
established. In early modernization the contraction of power in the parliament was important 
for leaderships of rising classes (entrepreneurs, workers and peasants). When a modern 
regime has been installed, the process turns to detraction. The administrative power is 
enlarged. When the values conflict is once again intensified, e.g. by sharper and deeper class 
divisions created by industrialization and socialist movements demanded power (in Norway 
1870-1920) a new contraction will take place. The regime pulls power together in the public 
bureaucracy (Gran 1994). The broad popular socialist movement gained power in parliaments. 
But it did not succeed in the interwar period as the liberal left movement had succeeded in the 
1880’s. It was first when the labour movement had a social democratic leadership that it 
gained government power (1928, briefly, 1935 a stable regime). That regime was, however, 
not eager to concentrate power in parliament. Rather it developed corporatist structures of 
government. (co-operation between the state bureaucracy, labour unions and employers’ 
organisations). In that way a new consensus emerged in 1945 around the concept of 
‘organised capitalism’, political power and control of the welfare state to the labour 
movement and control of capital production in private hands. That consensus led to a 
detraction of power, a movement of power to professional bureaucracy at all levels of state. 
After 1945 we see a doubly detracted regime: power to the corporative elite and power moved 
from parliaments to professional administration. Looking to the future we might ask how a 
new more global movement demanding sustainable modes of production might revitalise the 
value struggle within nation states, and how such a struggle might affect the relation between 
politics and administration and between the national and regional/continental organisations of 
political power.  
 
We might ask, can the detraction-contraction processes lead to change beyond democracy? 
Can the conflict level become so high or so low that it threatens the democratic order? In 
figure 18.1 I have illustrated three different deductions from the law, focussing on possible 
development trajectories within and beyond the democratic order.  
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 INSERT fig. 18.1: Values plurality/conflict level and transition of power in democracy. 
Tresholds for "democracy breakdown" or transition to other State forms. 
 
In this figure I consider contraction and detraction as movements on the vertical power axis: 
contraction upward and detraction downward, regardless of starting-point on the axis. The 
horizontal axis is the value axis, conceived the same way: movement to the right, a movement 
toward value plurality and conflict, movement to the left toward value consensus. The B 
curve (straight line) describes the basic content of the law. When values plurality and conflict 
increases powerful elites may contract power in the political institutions they have access to. 
When values plurality and conflict (in a configuration) decreases toward value homogeneity, 
another, different and reverse movement, termed detraction, takes place. Power is moved to 
bureaucracy and the administrative services.  
 
On the extreme points of curve B democracy breaks down. We can there speculate that other 
types of state emerge. When the values community becomes uniform and politics, through 
detraction, has been reduced to administration in the extreme, we have a "Communist Utopia" 
(often historically of course, a really existing communist dictatorship). When the values 
plurality is great, or division between existing political cultures is deep and the conflict level 
high, a transition to dictatorship can take place. 
 
If curve B described the dynamics of the law in a democratic regime in general, curve A 
describes a variation. That curve indicates that a considerable contraction can take place as a 
consequence of a small increase in value conflict. It indicates that full or maximum 
contraction can occur relatively early in the development of value conflicts. The curve can be 
said to describe an unstable democratic regime, a regime of perhaps low legitimacy, what we 
might call a "politicians' regime".  By that I mean a regime that is in strict control of the 
bureaucracy and expert knowledge despite the fact that value conflicts are relatively low. 
Examples might be neo-liberal regimes that are threatened externally and that are 
ideologically committed to ‘reduce bureaucracy’.  
 
Curve C describes a democratic regime managed by the bureaucracy, allowing a high value 
plurality and a high conflict level. Contraction is slow relative to movements on the value 
axis. The curve presents a regime we might suggest that is taken by surprise. Conflicts 
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suddenly appear to it. Because the regime has been run by a stable, legitimate administration 
(despite the conflicts), when the conflicts become manifest or threatening inexperienced 
politicians are thrown into the centres of power, and contraction is rapid and comprehensive 
(the far right side of curve C).  
 
The three curves describe three different democratic regimes, all of which can break down in 
their extremes of value conflict and detraction-contraction. Detraction can in all cases turn to 
‘administrative dictatorship’, as contraction can lead to authoritarian rule. The field of 
relatively stable democracy is the central field in the figure, where a moderate process of 
contraction and detraction is taking place and where the turns between the two occur before 
extremes of either have been reached (low velocity oscillation). Under that condition the 
democratic society is stable, but with inherent "threats" of going too far along both diagonal 
axes. Jacobsen emphasized how detraction could threaten democracy, and how bureaucracy 
could "stop the production of new values". In his preface to the 1964 text, this danger is 
expressed as one of the motives of the study. 
 
…another issue is related to the social role of knowledge transfer and the risk that 
society is transformed into a despotism of good-will where there is no further 
production of new values (Jacobsen 1964: ii). 
 
In the extreme sectors of figure 18.1 democracy breaks down due to the disappearance of the 
dynamics in the movement of power. Either movement goes uncontrolled to its extreme. In 
the upper left corner the contraction is completed in the leader ruling on behalf of "all". In the 
upper right corner the conflict is "solved" by means of dictatorial administrative (military) 
power. In the lower left corner class dynamics as well as the tension between political 
leadership and administration have been dissolved (in a Communist Utopia), and in the lower 
right corner there are conflicts everywhere, but no collective leadership (anarchy). 
 
I have given a specification of the general theory in two directions: i) the relation between 
contraction and detraction is "serial" and "linear". Power dissemination to the administration 
takes place after successful contraction. Detraction is usually a linear extension of the values 
of the ruling regime, only rarely generating a movement against the value-power system 
created by the contraction. ii) detraction means a transfer of political power in democracies 
from the parties and parliaments to professions and bureaucrats. Detraction does not 
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necessarily mean a “real” community of values: A low level of manifest conflict is sufficient. 
Detraction then is usually an increase of the bureaucracy's own power after establishment of a 
certain political order, caused by a successful contraction. Bureaucracy can blur and suppress 
conflict and block innovation. A new contraction (more often then not) comes about on the 
basis of genuinely new values, defined and defended by a new social mobilization, a new 
social movement. 
 
Centralisation and decentralisation within a bureaucracy is then a separate problem, external 
to but not unrelated to the problem of contraction and detraction of political power. The 
bureaucratic leadership can be a strict control and command centre or a unit coordinating-
assisting autonomous administrations spread out in the country-region. Centralisation can 
occur in at least three situations. (1) When bureaucracy makes itself independent of the 
democratic state institutions, endeavouring to actively increase its own power, in favour of 
specifically bureaucratic values (power as such and privileges); (2) When a political regime is 
challenged by an opposition in the parliament. The regime can then have to stick to detraction 
but might well favour centralisation of power in the bureaucracy; (3) When a regime 
considers co-operation between labour-capital and the state in the administrative sphere more 
important than ruling through the regular public administration and/or through parliaments. 
Then centralisation of power in the bureaucracy might be necessary to uphold and implement 
not too popular ‘corporative agreements’ made at the national level. 
 
It might seem that Dahl Jacobsen’s theory of contraction is more convincing than the theory 
of detraction. That rising movements in democratic societies try to concentrate power in 
parliaments is a strong theory. That value consensus should lead to detraction, to a weakening 
of parliaments and a strengthening of the bureaucracy is not as obvious or convincing. Why 
shouldn’t a consensus on values strengthen parliaments and weaken bureaucracies creating a 
more direct relation between politicians and people? Perhaps detraction of power to the 
bureaucracy and a reduction of bureaucratic power relative to parliaments can take place 
simultaneously? Detraction can take the form of less power to the bureaucracy and more 
power to professionals and organisations in civil society or even in the commercial sphere. 
The power of normative regulation professions can be reduced, while the power of technical, 
consequence-oriented professions can be increased. Public services can be replaced by private 
services. In this sense detraction can take many forms, each form affecting the distribution of 
power between the public and the private sectors differently. Transfers of power from the 
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public to the private sector (privatization) can affect the dynamics of the contraction-
detraction process, making both the introduction of new values into the public sector and the 
movement from detraction to contraction of political power more difficult. If this is true the 
transfer of political power from the public to the private sector has an element of 
‘irreversibility’. 
 
Generality and testability. Critique 
 
How can we test the CD law and how fruitful it is in the study of politics outside the Nordic 
area? If we assume that development in a given democracy is heading toward contraction, the 
action models of the public servants should be more in conformity with government policies 
and values or the public servants should feel the pressure for political loyalty more intensely. 
Their autonomy should be reduced. Contraction should mean a strengthening of parliaments 
and politicians relative to bureaucrats. The thesis is also testable against alternative theories, 
e.g.: By increasing values community the power of parliaments will increase relative to the 
power of professional bureaucracy. Parliaments take on more power because people want to 
increase their direct self-administration, avoiding costly and often policy distorting 
interventions by the bureaucracy.  
 
If the CD thesis is valid for Norway it should similarly be valid for other Scandinavian and 
Nordic countries. It ought not be valid or need radical reformulation if applied in non-
democratic or weakly democratic societies (for example in Tanzania and Zimbabwe). We 
might compare Britain and the US. We could expect radically more detraction in England 
than in the US under conditions of value consensus, because professions and sector 
administrations are historically powerful and autonomous in Britain, while public 
administration is limited and connected to political regimes in the US. In the US the 
bureaucracy is weak, pragmatic and values-loaded. The political power that is present is 
located in elected bodies. Leaders in the public administration are politically appointed. 
 
In Africa many new states are a compound of colonial bureaucracy, parliamentary democracy 
and ethnic-political elite regimes, the compound often called neo-patrimonialism (Medard 
1991). The administrative services are often weak and politicized (Appiah et. al. 2004). The 
expert groups are small, rendering the contraction-detraction interplay insignificant. But a 
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hypothesis might be that the struggle between politics and representation (contraction) and 
bureaucracy and management of power on behalf of the established order (detraction) is 
present inside African political parties and movements.  
 
Jacobsen’s work from 1964 can be seen as a precursor of Peter Evan’s (1995) idea of how the 
embedded autonomy of the public administration is important for development in third world 
countries. The nearness of administrators to clients they are set to serve provides both with 
realistic information. The condition for such nearness according to Jacobsen is shared 
knowledge and ideological/cultural identification with the clients. The idea of administrative 
neutrality and the administrator’s identification with “the common interest” can in practice 
favour resource rich peoples’ access to public services. However, distance is also necessary. 
Closeness to clients can lead to ‘privatisation’ of the public administration, in the sense of 
certain client groups gaining control of ‘public office’. Autonomy depends on the presence of 
a common culture, an organisation culture within the public office. If such an ‘esprit d’etat’ is 
not in place the same rules can be interpreted very differently by bureaucrats in the same 
office, power struggles between bureaucrats can hamper decision making and weaken the 
legitimacy of the office. In Jacobsen’s view both autonomy and nearness are dependent upon 
the education of the bureaucrats and their socialisation into an academic discipline which they 
master, of which they are proud and which has been developed within specific cultures and/or 
functional areas in society. Theoretical-methodical knowledge gives professionals distance 
and autonomy; empirical knowledge provides nearness to ‘reality’.  
 
The contraction-detraction thesis has something to say about the division of modern societies 
into closed, culture-specific, not communicating or even antagonistic sub-groups, or separate 
hierarchic pillars (pillarisation theory or the ‘verzeuilungs’ thesis, Lijphart 1968 and Post 
1989). From research into politics in the Netherlands the authors found that society divided 
along religious lines. Protestants, Catholics and Humanists constituted their respective 
hierarchic communities or pillars with only elite co-operation across the pillars at the top level 
holding society together. Pillarisation meant a movement of power from the state to civil 
society, radically weakening the national democracy. It was when the political parties again 
gained strength as political movements that power was brought back to the state institutions. 
Pillarisation could be termed extreme contraction of power, not in democratic parliaments, but 
in separate elite-managed religious hierarchies, threatening the democratic order as such. 
Contraction of power in religious communities would allow little room for internal 
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‘administrative autonomy’, demanding that ‘administrators’ adhere to the religious fiats, 
subordinating empirical knowledge to those fiats. The mobilisation of ‘secular’ political 
parties against the power of the religious pillars might be seen as detraction, in the sense that 
empirical knowledge is given increased importance in political decision making. However, 
the first step in that process is a detraction of power to politicians, opening for detraction to 
the professionals in the public administration in the next turn around, when the political 





As Dahl Jacobsen’s detraction and contraction thesis is based on Norwegian materials it is 
there in Norwegian political institutional history it should be primarily tested. However, I will 
briefly investigate the relevance of the theory in other societies, where democracy has been 
less developed.  
 
At the threshold of modern Norway 1850-1900 
 
In Knut Dahl Jacobsen’s interpretation Johan Sverdrup’s Left (liberal) regime installed in the 
1880’s was a result of a successful contraction of power in the Storting. In the struggle for 
power between the Liberal movement and Swedish-Norwegian officialdom the successful 
liberal movement concentrated power in the Storting, not least through the creation of 
political parties Left (liberals) and Right (conservatives). The parties strengthened the force of 
movements at the central national level. The new Storting pushed the government officials 
from political leadership back into the bureaucracy, and  placed the Government under the 
direction of the Storting. The demand that gained currency was that  an appointed 
Government should immediately have the approval of the Storting. When political initiative, 
ability to oblige the Government and responsibility for the effects of Government activity was 
concentrated in the Storting, bureaucracy was made a tool of democracy. Bureaucracy was re-
organised: a new type of loyal, politically committed and extrovert bureaucrats were placed in 
leading positions. The old official conceiving himself as being above politics and leading a 
secluded worklife in the corridors of the administration serving ‘the people in general’ and 
acting on ‘pure science’, was pushed aside. 
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 In this way the contraction, or the concentration of power in the Storting created a unitary 
democratic state in Norway, unitary in the sense of the Storting being in control of the whole 
state system. King, courts and bureaucracy were reduced to autonomous institutions under the 
legal and political guidance of the Parliament. Through its power over the installation of the 
Cabinet the Storting exerted influence over organisation and decision-making in the public 
administration. The parties increased the power of Government in the population, making 
ruling parties instruments for the dissemination and implementation of public policy.  
 
The increased dependence of (the Director of Agriculture) Smitt on the political 
authorities was brought about in a period when the Storting increased its power. I will 
term this a political contraction process, characterized by the concentration of 
initiative, responsibility and ability to establish obligations in the Storting. An official 
ideal materialized, emphasising the official’s political loyalty, his capability of 
adapting himself to the shifting purposes of the politicians, his qualities as “the good 
advocate” (Jacobsen 1964:199).   
 
The conflict between the rising liberal movement in society and the officialdom ruling in the 
Storting (created in the Constitution of 1814), deepened in the 1840’s, as peasant proprietors 
and town citizens elected ‘their own’ into the Storting. The officials and their supporters in 
the Right Conservative Party entrenched themselves in the Government (Seip 1945). The 
social classes entrenched themselves in the institutions they dominated: farmers and town 
citizens in the Storting, and the (few) industrial entrepreneurs and public officials in the state 
administrations and the juridical system. Officialdom was split between “paternalists” 
representing the culture of religion and patriarchy, and “modernists” bureaucrats wanting to 
use the state to develop the economy in favour of entrepreneurs, markets and exports. The key 
success factor for the liberal movement according to Dahl Jacobsen was the ability to 
strengthen and concentrate state power in the Parliament.  
 
Norway after 1945. Detraction of power to the bureaucracy 
 
It is unclear how Dahl Jacobsen viewed political-administrative developments in Norway in 
the period from 1905 (when Norway pulled out of the union with Sweden) to 1945, when the 
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Germans, after five years of occupation, left the country. Gran (1994) argues that the power of 
the Storting was gradually reduced in this forty-year period, with power being concentrated in 
the public administration and the corporative network. The leadership of the labour movement 
had given up on socialism but favoured intuitively I believe, administration and corporate co-
operation to powerful parliaments. Dahl Jacobsen suggests that the 1945 – 1960 period was 
characterised by detraction of power to the public administration.  
 
The contraction process (of the 1880-1900 period) is a thorough contrast to 
developments in Norway after the Second World War. After the War government has 
been aimed at spreading initiative and responsibility in the bureaucracy, increasing 
expert legitimacy and creating a looser obligation of experts to the political authorities.  
I would term this change, these expectations and concomitant reorganisations, a 
political detraction process (Jacobsen 1964:199-200).    
 
The condition for detraction or power dissemination into the bureaucracy is a values 
community or the absence of manifest political antagonisms. Detraction is a transfer of power 
from politics to administration, and thereby also to the professions. The overall picture is that 
of a society with undisputed values, where the bureaucrats realize the values through 
administration based on established knowledge. Norway after 1955, solidly placed in the 
Western sphere, with the economists’ circulation models for the open state and national 
economies as a common stock of ideas and economic-political language, is an instance of 
detraction of political power, dissemination of executive power to the bureaucracy, with the 
welfare professions in local community institutions as “public servants at the street level”. 
 
The transformation of state power to party rule 
 
Is the CD theory of relevance and of interest in the analysis of politics in states with 
authoritarian or feebly developed democracies? Dahl Jacobsen’s detraction of power took 
place in the ‘values homogenous’, rich Western society of Norway. There the capital – wage 
worker contradiction was relatively appeased after 1945 and an agreement was reached 
between labour, capital and the state that an independent, relatively strong and socially 
responsible state was important for a “civilized” development of capitalism, the arrangement 
as a whole called the welfare state. Historically it might be argued that power was spread in 
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the highly authoritarian bureaucracy of the czars in Russia and emperors in China. The 
autonomy of the bureaucrats varied, but was ultimately under the direct rule of the czars-
emperors. There were no democratic institutions, so the possibility of contraction of power in 
Dahl Jacobsen’s terms was not possible. In those long histories centralisation-decentralisation 
is the more relevant dichotomy. After the 1917 and 1949 revolutions there have been brief 
occurrences of elected power, but the lack of powerful freely elected organs of state, makes 
the Dahl Jacobsen/Eisenstadt dichotomy relatively uninteresting in the analysis of the 
“Communist” regimes. The formation of the communist parties from social-political-
intellectual movements in “civil society” can be seen as an element of potential 
democratisation, but developments after their attainment of power, makes the idea of 
detraction of power to autonomous bureaucrats and experts rather irrelevant.  
 
In Africa liberation from colonialism has traits similar to the revolutionary processes of 
Russia and China. The formation of the liberation movements was a potential element of 
democratisation. Their successful struggle against colonial rulers was a definite step in the 
direction of democracy. The colonial rulers seldom organised bureaucracies deeply into 
African communities, like those Russia and China historically are famous for. That meant 
liberation was a radical return to pre-colonial forms of authority, in effect a combination of 
military bureaucratic and traditional patriarchal forms of authority. Except for their military 
power, the new “liberated” states have been weak states. A military-ethnic elite has often held 
state power, with limited ability to tax and deliver services to the population. Detraction of 
power to an autonomous bureaucracy has seldom been an alternative. 
 
When parliaments are weak in states with a developed capitalist economy, political parties are 
often stronger. The ability of social movements to create political parties and to contract 
power in them, may then be an element of strengthening democracy. However their 
possibility of supporting a detraction process and their role as developers of democracy are 
ambiguous, also in Western societies. On the one hand parties can mobilize participation in 
politics and focus the political struggle around a programme. In this sense they can definitely 
be participants in a democratization process. On the other hand political parties have to 
prepare themselves to take on overall state authority (if and when they gain the necessary 
support from voters). In that context party leaders can become more interested in giving form 
to a “realistic” political programme than in listening to their own members. Fitting the party 
into the struggles between the political elites can be more important than allowing for party 
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democracy. Political parties can weaken parliaments, can seek other channels of influence, 
because parliaments are good arenas for other competing political parties. One instance is 
Germany and the non-socialist parties of the Weimar republic (Caplan 1988). A weak 
parliament, the absence of an efficient public administration, international humiliation and 
fear of the Social Democrats resulted in the non-socialists rallying round Hitler. 
 
1917 Russia and 1949 China are instances of weak parliaments and strong parties conceiving 
themselves as state. At the time of liberation (1980) Zimbabwe had a weak parliament. The 
Zanu-pf party conceived of itself as state and cracked down on the opposition. A chaotic, 
rather dictatorial regime came into being when a new opposition (the Movement for 
Democratic Change) arose. The party state encountered opposition from two sides: From the 
MDC and from “association leaders” powerful in their respective pillars in society: farmers, 
industry leaders, the Shona and Ndebele peoples and the poor farmers in the “reserves” (Gran 
2002). Tanzania is another example of this party state syndrome, even though the division 
into separate “associations” has not taken place in Tanzania, and the Party’s use of force has 
been at a lower level than in Zimbabwe.  
 
This means that by feeble modernisation or when bureaucracy does not permeate society, 
detraction in Dahl Jacobsen’s meaning of the term does not take place. Capitalism is often 
present in urban areas, but has not penetrated the peasant societies. There is then a deep value 
conflict but common democratic institutions are not there, where democratic movements 
through negotiations and compromises could transform their power to national policy. 
Entrepreneurs and professions are hardly present. Party, dominant ethnic group and the 
leaders of (weak) public administrations unite into a ruling elite, backed up internally by 
military power. In the values homogenous Tanzania with a strong legitimacy in the 
international community a certain division between the CCM party, the National Assembly 
and the public administration has developed. However, Party power is dominant. Opposition 
is weak. The idea of contracting power in Parliament is therefore not pressing for anyone. 
Also under Julius Nyerere the Party saw itself mainly as state and only secondly as a 
democratically mobilizing force. However, CCM might in periods of low levels of political 
debate be tempted to detract power to the bureaucracy under its control. This could under 
favourable conditions lead to more local autonomy and to development of real – and loyal – 
opposition movements and thus a strengthening of democracy. 
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South Africa has a dire history of a powerful modern-legally based bureaucracy, giving form 
to and serving the administration of apartheid (from 1948 to 1990). State power had a 
corporate form: a corporation between the political and the economic wings of the ruling class 
managing the whole society as if it was a patriarchal industrial enterprise (migrant labour, 
pass laws and physical containment of black people and separation of classes and races in the 
urban areas). A kind of democracy functioned within the ruling class but was absent 
otherwise. A play of relations between the parliamentary and the bureaucratic powers was, so 
to speak, ruled out. With liberation and the new democratic Constitution in 1990-1994-1996 
the elected, parliamentary institutions, at least at the provincial and national levels, were 
suddenly in place. ANC, with its long history of mobilisation and struggle against apartheid, 
took the majority of seats in most of them. But will ANC favour the constructive interaction 
between contraction and detraction of power? Two problems are obvious. ANC does not 
consider the opposition parties with histories into apartheid as fully legitimate actors in 
parliaments. In this sense there is a tendency towards an ANC- party state, with parliaments 
more as ‘executive committees’. ANC is similarly sceptical to large categories of bureaucrats 
with histories into apartheid. Therefore a detraction of power to the bureaucracy, with the 
possibility of professionalizing the bureaucracy, is not imminent. At the same time there is a 
grand irony in ANC’s situation as ruling party. While struggling for liberation a socialist-
social democratic outlook informed the struggle. With liberation that outlook was seriously 
discredited both in the east and the west. ANC was either forced/pushed or itself advanced 
into a neo-liberal programmatic position, giving up the idea of a strong redistributive and 
regulatory state just as the Party reached Government position. In this sense a detraction of 
power, mainly to private organisations and administrations may be the actual and unintended 
outcome of present (2003) developments.  
 
The instances of contraction of political power into parties when parliaments are weak, give 
form to party states. That leads to political parties giving priority to state management rather 
than class specific political mobilisation. High level of conflict and weak parliaments can lead 
party states to dismantle whatever processes of democratisation that were present. Party states 
can take constitutional arrangements out of the democratic field depicted in Figure 18.1. Knut 
Dahl Jacobsen’s CD theory purports that such deterioration is inherent in democracy itself. 
Detraction is linked up with community of values, but weakens at the same time democracy 
as open ‘parliamentary’ dialogue and confrontations between rulers and opposition. 
Detraction of power reduces or eliminates the innovation needed for a stable reproduction of 
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the democratic order. The contraction process, especially when it is directed at the open 
parliamentary arenas and institutions has this critical innovative capacity. The CD theory 
specifies that democratic innovation process. New value programmes emerge from society, 
stimulated by among other things the representation principle of parliaments. Professionals 
are mediators between new social movements and political power. Culture conscious 
knowledge production is a key to democratisation. Given the presence of parliaments and the 
ability of movements to organize politically (contraction),‘socially embedded’ professionals 
provide both language and insights for decision-making in bureaucracies and for policy-




The shift between contraction and detraction of political power is the shift between innovation 
(contraction) and preservation of the democratic order and the normalisation of a regime 
(detraction). When contraction of power has taken place and a unified system of power 
management is built around that contraction, there is a tendency to close the parliamentary 
arena (even weak reform ideas seem unrealistic), to detract power to the bureaucracy and thus 
to weaken the democratic institutions. Politics takes on a new form: it is hidden as dialogue 
and decision making between bureaucrats, professions and administrative institutions. When 
power is contracted to other institutions than openly elected parliaments, that is to public 
administration, to political parties, to organisations in civil society and in the private sector, 
the effect on democracy is questionable. Western democracies contain institutions that are 
immune to public elections: families, churches, bureaucracies and private firms. Democracies 
therefore systematically contain both formative and destructive forces. The functioning of the 
detraction-contraction process is important for the normalisation-innovation-opposition 
dynamic vital for their survival.  
 
Can new social movements become powerful actors in the formation and reproduction of 
democracies, of democratic rule? They might. If globalisation weakens national states, the 
importance of international-global social movements may increase. They can vitalise 
democratic processes. They can become agents that ‘contract’ power into public institutions 
(at local, national, regional and global levels). The global movements are, from this point of 
view, a parallel to the Norwegian bourgeois urban movement in the 19th century, criticizing 
 21
 22
officialdom in politics, demanding a separation of state and society that would create a space 
for private entrepreneurship in markets and rule based elections among “responsible citizens”. 
At present (2003) detraction of state power to public and especially to private bureaucracies is 
widespread in the Western world. The detraction policy is being exported to developing 
countries through a host of Western institutions. The creation of open public arenas and 
democratic institutions where such do not exist and the contraction of power into them, 
through empowerment of social and political movements is as important today as it was when 
Johan Sverdrup, as leader of the liberal opposition movement and the Liberal Party (from 
1882) concentrated political power in the democratic institution par excellence in Norway, in 
the Storting. With that concentration a new unitary state took form. That state established step 
by step the infrastructure for a modern capital-producing economy. With the labour 
movement the capital-economy was ‘modified’ or ‘civilised’ through the gradual 
establishment of a public welfare system, a system that the present detraction policy - 
detraction of power primarily to institutions in civil society - is deconstructing. Dahl Jacobsen 
would be optimistic I am sure. “New knowledge will be produced, new movements will arise 
and a new contraction of power in democratic institutions will occur. It may even occur 
suddenly!”               
 
I wrote this in gratitude for a long an inspiring professional co-operation with Knut Dahl 
Jacobsen. Stein Ugelvik Larsen has been a strict and valuable critical editor of the manuscript. 
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elaboration/discussion of it clearer. A special thanks to my brother Haakon.     
